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V. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
TRIALS IN EUROPE
» Note.—1. The prosecution of enemy persons responsible for acts of violence
inflicted upon the civilian populations of occupied countries was envisaged in
a Declaration signed at London on 13 January 1942 by representatives of
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Free France, Greece, Luxembourg, The Netherlands,
Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia. 37 American Journal of International Law
(1943), p. 84.
2. In 1943, a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes
was established at London, to investigate war crimes against nationals of the
United Nations, to assemble the information available, and to report from time
to time to the Governments concerned.
3. In a conference at Moscow on 30 October 1943, the Foreign Secretaries
of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union,
speaking in the interests of the United Nations, issued a declaration giving
"full warning" that German officers and men and members of the Nazi party
responsible for atrocities, massacres and executions would be sent back to the
countries in which their deeds were done for punishment according to the laws
of those countries. This declaration was made without prejudice to the cases
of the major criminals whose offenses had no particular geographical localiza-
tion, as it was contemplated that such persons would be punished by the joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies. 38 American Journal of International
Law (Supp. 1944), p. 7.
4. On 8 August 1945, the Governments of the United States, France, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, "acting in the interests of all the United
Nations," concluded an Agreement at London for the establishment, "after
consultation with the Control Council for Germany," of an International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the trial of certain war criminals whose offenses had no par-
ticular geographical localization. Naval War College, International Law Docu-
ments 1944-45, p. 249. The Agreement entered into force at once; it was to
continue in force for a period of one year and thereafter subject to termination
by any signatory on one month's notice. The Agreement was open to adherence
by "any Government of the United Nations," and the Governments of the
following 19 states adhered to it: Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Ethiopia, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugo-
slavia. 14 Department of State Bulletin (1946) 261, 954.
5. The Charter annexed to the Agreement of 8 August 1945 set up an Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the "trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis." Slight errors in the English and French
versions of Article 6, paragraph c, as compared with the Russian version, were
rectified by a protocol signed at Berlin on 6 October 1945. Executive Agreement
Series No. 472.
6. Members of the International Military Tribunal, and alternates, were
appointed by each of the four States signatory to the London Agreement of 8
August 1945. All were civilians except the member and the alternate desig-
nated by the Soviet Union. The Tribunal first met at Berlin on 15 October 1945.
7. On 18 October 1945, twenty-four Germans were indicted before the Inter-
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national Military Tribunal, in the name of the four States signatory to the
London Agreement. Each of the defendants was charged on one or more of the
following counts: 1) a common plan or conspiracy; 2) crimes against peace;
3) war crimes; 4) crimes against humanity. The Tribunal was also asked to
declare that the Reich Cabinet, various Nazi organizations, and the General
.
Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces were criminal. Depart-
ment of State Publication 2420, p. 23. One of the defendants (Robert Ley)
having died, twenty-three were arraigned before the Tribunal; the trial of one
defendant (Gustav Krupp) was postponed; and one defendant (Martin Bormann)
was tried in his absence.
8. The trial at Niirnberg began on 20 November 1945, and ended on 31
August 1946. The Tribunal held 403 open sessions; 33 witnesses were heard
for the prosecution, while 61 witnesses, in addition to nineteen of the defendants,
testified for the defense; 143 additional witnesses gave evidence for the defense
by means of written answers to interrogatories. The Tribunal heard 22 wit-
nesses for organizations, in addition to the evidence taken by commissioners.
In the judgment rendered on 30 September and 1 October 1946, 19 of the 22
defendants who came to trial were found guilty on one or more counts of the
indictment, and three were acquitted. Twelve were sentenced to death by
hanging; one committed suicide, and eleven were executed. Three Nazi organi-
zations and the Secret State Police were declared to have been criminal in
character.
9. Though it had been contemplated that in subsequent proceedings the
International Military Tribunal would proceed to other trials, no such pro-
ceedings were held by the Tribunal, and it did not later convene.
10. In a report made to President Truman on 9 November 1946, Francis
Biddle, American Member of the International Military Tribunal, recommended
"that the United Nations as a whole reaffirm the principles of the Niirnberg
Charter in the context of a general codification of offences against the peace and
security of mankind." In reply, President Truman stated that the setting up
of "a code of international criminal law to deal with all who wage aggressive
war . . . deserves to be studied and weighed by the best legal minds the world
over"; and he expressed the hope that the United Nations would carry out Judge
Biddle's recommendation. 15 Department of State Bulletin 954-957. A
proposal in this sense was made by the American Delegation to the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 15 November 1946. United Nations Docu-
ment A/C.6/69. On 11 December 1946, the General Assembly took note of the
London Agreement and annexed Charter, as well as the Tokyo Charter, and
adopted a resolution affirming the principles of international law recognized
by the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal.
11. On 20 December 1945, by its Law No. 10, the Control Council for Ger-
many provided for national tribunals to be set up in the various zones of
German}- for the trial of persons accused of war crimes. Ordinance No. 7,
adopted by the Military Government for Germany, United States Zone, on 18
October 1946, made provision for tribunals in the United States Zone and set
out the procedure for them to follow.
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(20) Excerpts from the Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal, Ntirnberg, 30 September-1 October
1946
The International Military Tribunal
nurnberg, germany
Lord Justice Lawrence, Member for the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
President
Mr. Justice Birkett, Alternate Member
Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States
of America
Judge John J. Parker, Alternate Member
M. Le Professeur Donnedieu de Vabres, Member
for the French Republic
M. Le Conseiller R. Falco, Alternate Member
Major General I. T. Nikitchenko, Member for
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Lieutenant Colonel A. F. Volchkov, Alternate
Member
prosecution counsel
Chief Prosecutor for the United States of America:
Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson
Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland: H. M. Attorney-
General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, K. C, M. P.
Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic: M. Fran-
cois de Menthon; M. Auguste Champetier de
Ribes
Chief Prosecutor for the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: General R. A. Rudenko
The United States of America, the French Repub-
lic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and




Hermann Wilhelm Goering, Rudolf Hess, Joachim
von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Wilhelm Keitel,
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans
Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Walter
Funk, Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von
Bohlen und Halbach, Karl Doenitz, Erich Raeder,
Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Alfred Jodl,
Martin Bormann, Franz von Papen, Artur Seyss-
Inquart, Albert Speer, Constantin von Neurath,
and Hans Fritzsche, Individually and as Members
of Any of the Following Groups or Organizations
to Which They Respectively Belonged, Namely:
Die Reichsregierung (Reich Cabinet); Das Korps
Der Politischen Leiter Der Nationalsozialistischen
Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (Leadership Corps of
the Nazi Party) ; Die Schutzstaffeln Der National-
sozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei (com-
monly known as the "SS") and including Die
Sicherheitsdienst (commonly known as the "SD");
Die Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police,
commonly known as the "Gestapo") ; Die Sturmab-
teilungen Der N. S. D. A. P. (commonly known
as the "SA") and the General Staff and High
Command of the German Armed Forces all as
defined in Appendix B of the Indictment,
defendants.
* * * In Berlin, on the 18th October 1945, in
accordance with Article 14 of the Charter, an in-
dictment was lodged against the defendants named
in the caption above, who had been designated by
the Committee of the Chief Prosecutors of the signa-
tory powers as major war criminals.
A copy of the indictment in the German language
was served upon each defendant in custody at least
30 days before the trial opened. . . .
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The defendant Robert Ley committed suicide in
prison on the 25th October 1945. On the 15th
November 1945 the Tribunal decided that the de-
fendant Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach
could not then be tried because of his physical and
mental condition, but that the charges against him
in the indictment should be retained for trial there-
after, if the physical and mental condition of the
defendant should permit. On the 17th November
1945 the Tribunal decided to try the defendant Bor-
mann in his absence under the provisions of Article
12 of the Charter. After argument, and considera-
tion of full medical reports, and a statement from the
defendant himself, the Tribunal decided on the 1st
December 1945 that no grounds existed for a post-
ponement of the trial against the defendant Hess
because of his mental condition. A similar decision
was made in the case of the defendant Streicher.
In accordance with Articles 16 and 23 of the Char-
ter, counsel were either chosen by the defendants in
custody themselves, or at their request were ap-
pointed by the Tribunal. In his absence the Tribunal
appointed counsel for the defendant Bormann, and
also assigned counsel to represent the named groups
or organizations.
The trial which was conducted in four languages
—
English, Russian, French, and German—began on
the 20th November 1945, and pleas of "Not guilty"
were made by all the defendants except Bormann.
The hearing of evidence and the speeches of counsel
concluded on 31 August 1946.
Four hundred and three open sessions of the Tri-
bunal have been held; 33 witnesses gave evidence
orally for the prosecution against the individual
defendants, and 61 witnesses, in addition to 19 of the
defendants, gave evidence for the defense.
A further 143 witnesses gave evidence for the
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defense by means of written answers to interroga-
tories.
The Tribunal appointed commissioners to hear
evidence relating to the organizations, and 101 wit-
nesses were heard for the defense before the commis-
sioners, and 1,809 affidavits from other witnesses
were submitted. Six reports were also submitted,
summarizing the contents of a great number of fur-
ther affidavits.
Thirty-eight thousand affidavits, signed by 155,000
people, were submitted on behalf of the Political
Leaders, 136,213 on behalf of the SS, 10,000 on behalf
of the SA, 7,000 on behalf of the SD, 3,000 on behalf
of the General Staff and OKW, and 2,000 on behalf of
the Gestapo.
The Tribunal itself heard 22 witnesses for the
organizations. The documents tendered in evidence
for the prosecution of the individual defendants and
the organizations numbered several thousands. A
complete stenographic record of everything said in
court has been made, as well as an electrical recording
of all the proceedings.
Copies of all the documents put in evidence by
the prosecution have been supplied to the defense in
the German language. The applications made by
the defendants for the production of witnesses and
documents raised serious problems in some instances,
on account of the unsettled state of the country.
It was also necessary to limit the number of witnesses
to be called, in order to have an expeditious hearing,
in accordance with Article 18 (c) of the Charter.
The Tribunal, after examination, granted all those
applications which in its opinion were relevant to
the defense of any defendant or named group or
organization, and were not cumulative. Facilities
were provided for obtaining those witnesses and
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documents granted through the office of the General
Secretary established by the Tribunal.
Much of the evidence presented to the Tribunal on
behalf of the prosecution was documentary evidence,
captured by the Allied armies in German Army
headquarters, Government buildings, and elsewhere.
Some of the documents were found in salt mines,
buried in the ground, hidden behind false walls, and
in other places thought to be secure from discovery.
The case, therefore, against the defendants rests in a
large measure on documents of their own making,
the authenticity of which has not been challenged
except in one or two cases. * * *
For the purpose of showing the background of
the aggressive war and war crimes charged in the
indictment, the Tribunal will begin by reviewing
some of the events that followed the First World
War, and in particular, by tracing the growth of the
Nazi Party under Hitler's leadership to a position of
, supreme power from which it controlled the destiny
of the whole German people, and paved the way for
the alleged commission of all the crimes charged
against the defendants. * * * [The Tribunal
reviewed the history of the Party's rise to power.]
The Common Plan of Conspiracy and Aggressive
War
The Tribunal now turns to the consideration of
the crimes against peace charged in the indictment.
Count one of the indictment charges the defendants
with conspiring or having a common plan to commit
crimes against peace. Count two of the indictment
charges the defendants with committing specific
crimes against peace by planning, preparing, in-
itiating, and waging wars of aggression against a
number of other States. It will be convenient to
consider the question of the existence of a common
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plan and the question of aggressive war together,
and to deal later in this judgment with the question
of the individual responsibility of the defendants.
The charges in the indictment that the defendants
planned and waged aggressive wars are charges of the
utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing.
Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent
states alone, but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not
only an international crime; it is the supreme inter-
national crime differing only from other war crimes
in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil
of the whole.
The first acts of aggression referred to in the in-
dictment are the seizure of Austria and Czechoslova-
kia; and the first war of aggression charged in the
indictment is the war against Poland begun on the
1st September 1939.
Before examining that charge it is necessary to
look more closely at some of the events which pre-
ceded these acts of aggression. The war against
Poland did not come suddenly out of an otherwise
clear sky; the evidence has made it plain that this
war of aggression, as well as the seizure of Austria
and Czechoslovakia, was premeditated and carefully
prepared, and was not undertaken until the moment
was thought opportune for it to be carried through
as a definite part of the preordained scheme and plan.
For the aggressive designs of the Nazi Government
were not accidents arising out of the immediate
political situation in Europe and the world; they were
a deliberate and essential part of Nazi foreign policy.
From the beginning, the National Socialist move-
ment claimed that its object was to unite the German
people in the consciousness of their mission and
destiny, based on inherent qualities of race, and under
the guidance of the Fuehrer.
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For its achievement, two things were deemed to be
essential: The disruption of the European order as
it had existed since the Treaty of Versailles, and the
creation of a Greater Germany beyond the frontiers
of 1914. This necessarily involved the seizure of
foreign territories.
War was seen to be inevitable, or at the very least,
highly probable, if these purposes were to be ac-
complished. The German people, therefore, with
all their resources, were to be organized as a great
political-military army, schooled to obey without
question any policy decreed by the State. * * *
[The Tribunal reviewed at length German prepara-
tion for aggression, the seizures of Austria and
Czechoslovakia, the aggression against Poland, the
successive invasions of Denmark, Norway, Belgium,
the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Yugoslavia, Greece,
and the U. S. S. R., and the commencement of war
against the United States.]
Violations of International Treaties
The Charter defines as a crime the planning or
waging of war that is a war of aggression or a war in
violation of international treaties. The Tribunal has
decided that certain of the defendants planned and
waged aggressive wars against 10 nations, and were
therefore guilty of this series of crimes. This makes
it unnecessary to discuss the subject in further detail,
or even to consider at any length the extent to which
these aggressive wars were also "wars in violation of
international treaties, agreements, or assurances."
These treaties are set out in appendix C of the indict-
ment. Those of principal importance are the fol-
lowing :
(A) HAGUE CONVENTIONS
In the 1899 Convention the signatory powers
agreed: "before an appeal to arms ... to have re-
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course, as far as circumstances allow, to the good
offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers."
A similar clause was inserted in the Convention for
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1907.
In the accompanying Convention Relative to Open-
ing of Hostilities, article I contains this far more
specific language:
"The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between
them must not commence without a previous and explicit warn-
ing, in the form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons,
or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war."
Germany was a party to these conventions.
(B) VERSAILLES TREATY
Breaches of certain provisions of the Versailles
Treaty are also relied on by the prosecution—not to
fortify the left bank of the Rhine (art. 42-44): to
"respect strictly the independence of Austria" (art.
80); renunciation of any rights in Memel (art. 99)
and the Free City of Danzig (art. 100); the recogni-
tion of the independence of the Czecho-Slovak State;
and the Military, Naval, and Air Clauses against
German rearmament found in part V. There is no
doubt that action was taken by the German Govern-
ment contrary to all these provisions, the details of
which are set out in appendix C. With regard to
the Treaty of Versailles, the matters relied on are:
1. The violation of articles 42 to 44 in respect of
the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.
2. The annexation of Austria on the 13th March
1938, in violation of aticle 80.
3. The incorporation of the district of Memel on
the 22d March 1939, in violation of article 99.
4. The incorporation of the Free City of Danzig
on the 1st September 1939, in violation of article 100.
5. The incorporation of the provinces of Bohemia
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and Moravia on the 16th March 1939, in violation of
article 81.
6. The repudiation of the military, naval and air
clauses of the treaty, in or about March of 1935.
On the 21st May 1935, Germany announced that,
whilst renouncing the disarmament clauses of the
treaty, she would still respect the territorial limita-
tions, and would comply with the Locarno Pact.
(With regard to the first five breaches alleged, there-
fore, the Tribunal finds the allegation proved.)
(C) TREATIES OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE, ARBITRATION,
AND NON-AGGRESSION
It is unnecessary to discuss in any detail the vari-
ous treaties entered into by Germany with other
powers. Treaties of Mutual Guarantee were signed
by Germany at Locarno in 1925, with Belgium,
France, Great Britain, and Italy, assuring the main-
tenance of the territorial status quo. Arbitration
treaties were also executed by Germany at Locarno
with Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and Poland.
Article I of the latter treaty is typical, providing:
"All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland
* * * which it may not be possible to settle amicably
by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for
decision to an arbitral tribunal . . ."
Conventions of arbitration and conciliation were
entered into between Germany, the Netherlands,
and Denmark in 1926; and between Germany and
Luxemburg in 1929. Nonaggression treaties were
executed by Germany with Denmark and Russia in
1939.
(D) KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT
The Pact of Paris was signed on the 27th August
1928 by Germany, the United States, Belgium,
France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, and
777534—48 17
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other countries; and subsequently by other powers.
The Tribunal has made full reference to the nature
of this Pact and its legal effect in another part of this
judgment. It is therefore not necessary to discuss
the matter further here, save to state that in the
opinion of the Tribunal this pact was violated by
Germany in all the cases of aggressive war charged
in the indictment. It is to be noted that on the 26th
January 1934, Germany signed a Declaration for the
Maintenance of Permanent Peace with Poland,
which was explicitly based on the Pact of Paris, and
in which the use of force was outlawed for a period
of 10 years.
The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider
any of the other treaties referred to in the appendix,
or the repeated agreements and assurances of her
peaceful intentions entered into by Germany.
(B) THE LAW OF THE CHARTER
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the
Agreement and Charter, and the crimes coming
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for which
there shall be individual responsibility, are set out in
Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and
binding upon the Tribunal.
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the
sovereign legislative power by the countries to which
the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and
the undoubted right of these countries to legislate
for the occupied territories has been recognized by
the civilized world. The Charter is not an arbitrary
exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations,
but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be shown, it
is the expression of international law existing at the
time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a con-
tribution to international law.
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, de-
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fined the law it was to administer, and made regula-
tions for the proper conduct of the trial. In doing
so, they have done together what any one of
them might have done singly; for it is not to be
doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up
special courts to administer law. With regard to
the constitution of the court, all that the defendants
are entitled to ask is to receive a fair trial on the
facts and law.
The Charter makes the planning or waging of a
war of aggression or a war in violation of interna-
tional treaties a crime; and it is therefore not strictly
necessary to consider whether and to what extent
aggressive war was a crime before the execution of
the London Agreement. But in view of the great
importance of the questions of law involved, the
Tribunal has heard full argument from the prosecu-
tion and the defense, and will express its view on the
matter.
It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a
fundamental principle of all law—international and
domestic—is that there can be no punishment of
crime without a preexisting law. "Nullum crimen
sine lege, nulla poena sine lege." It was submitted
that ex post facto punishment is abhorrent to the law
of all civilized nations, that no sovereign power had
made aggressive war a crime at the time the alleged
criminal acts were committed, that no statute had
defined aggressive war, that no penalty had been
fixed for its commission, and no court had been
created to try and punish offenders.
In the first place, it is to be observed that the
maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of
sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice.
To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in
defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked
neighboring states without warning is obviously un-
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true, for in such circumstances the attacker must
know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being
unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the
positions they did in the government of Germany,
the defendants, or at least some of them must have
known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing
recourse to war for the settlement of international
disputes; they must have known that they were
acting in defiance of all international law when in
complete deliberation they carried out their designs
of invasion and aggression. On this view of the
case alone, it would appear that the maxim has no
application to the present facts.
This view is strongly reinforced by a consideration
of the state of international law in 1939, so far as
aggressive war is concerned. The General Treaty
for the Renunciation of War of August 27, 1928, more
generally known as the Pact of Paris or the Kellogg-
Briand Pact, was binding on 63 nations, including
Germany, Italy, and Japan at the outbreak of war
in 1939. In the preamble, the signatories declared
that they were
—
"Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare
of mankind; persuaded that the time has come when a frank
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should
be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now
existing between their peoples should be perpetuated ... all
changes in their relations with one another should be sought only
by pacific means . . . thus uniting civilized nations of the world
in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their na-
tional policy . . ."
The first two articles are as follows:
"Article I. The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare
in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn re-
course to war for the solution of international controversies and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
to one another."
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"Article II. The High Contracting Parties agree that the set-
tlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature
or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among
them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."
The question is, what was the legal effect of this
pact? The nations who signed the pact or adhered
to it unconditionally condemned recourse to war
for the future as an instrument of policy, and express-
ly renounced it. After the signing of the pact, any
nation resorting to war as an instrument of national
policy breaks the pact. In the opinion of the Tribu-
nal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument
of national policy necessarily involves the proposition
that such a war is illegal in international law; and
that those who plan and wage such a war, with its
inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing
a crime in so doing. War for the solution of inter-
national controversies undertaken as an instrument
of national policy certainly includes a war of aggres-
sion, and such a war is therefore outlawed by the
pact. As Mr. Henry L. Stimson, then Secretary of
State of the United States, said in 1932:
"War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the
Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This means that it has become through-
out practically the entire world ... an illegal thing. Here-
after, when engaged in armed conflict, either one or both of them
must be termed violators of this general treaty law . . . We
denounce them as law breakers."
But it is argued that the pact does not expressly
enact that such wars are crimes, or set up courts to
try those who make such wars. To that extent the
same is true with regard to the laws of war contained
in the Hague Convention. The Hague Convention
of 1907 prohibited resort to certain methods of waging
war. These included the inhumane treatment of
prisoners, the employment of poisoned weapons, the
improper use of flags of truce, and similar matters.
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Many of these prohibitions had been enforced long
before the date of the Convention; but since 1907
they have certainly been crimes, punishable as of-
fenses against the laws of war; yet the Hague Con-
vention nowhere designates such practices as criminal,
nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made
of a court to try and punish offenders. For many
years past, however, military tribunals have tried
and punished individuals guilty of violating the rules
of land warfare laid down by this Convention. In the
opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive
war are doing that which is equally illegal, and of
much greater moment than a breach of one of the
rules of the Hague Convention. In interpreting
the words of the pact, it must be remembered that
international law is not the product of an interna-
tional legislature, and that such international agree-
ments as the Pact of Paris have to deal with general
principles of law, and not with administrative matters
of procedure. The law of war is to be found not
only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of
states which gradually obtained universal recognition,
and from the general principles of justice applied
by jurists and practiced by military courts. This
law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows
the needs of a changing world. Indeed, in many
cases treaties do no more than express and define
for more accurate reference the principles of law
already existing.
The view which the Tribunal takes of the true
interpretation of the pact is supported by the inter-
national history which preceded it. In the year
1923 the draft of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance
was sponsored by the League of Nations. In Article
I the treaty declared "that aggressive war is an in-
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ternational crime," and that the parties would
"undertake that no one of them will be guilty of
its commission." The draft treaty was submitted
to twenty-nine states, about half of whom were in
favor of accepting the text. The principal objection
appeared to be in the difficulty of defining the acts
which would constitute "aggression," rather than
any doubt as to the criminality of aggressive war.
The preamble to the League of Nations 1924 Protocol
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
("Geneva Protocol"), after "recognising the solidar-
ity of the members of the international community,"
declared that "a war of aggression constitutes a
violation of this solidarity and is an international
crime." It went on to declare that the contracting
parties were "desirous of facilitating the complete
application of the system provided in the Covenant
of the League of Nations for the pacific settlement
of disputes between the states and of ensuring the
repression of international crimes." The Protocol
was recommended to the members of the League of
Nations by a unanimous resolution in the Assembly
of the 48 members of the League. These members
included Italy and Japan, but Germany was not
then a member of the League.
Although the Protocol was never ratified, it was
signed by the leading statesmen of the world, re-
presenting the vast majority of the civilized States
and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evidence
of the intention to brand aggressive war as an in-
ternational crime.
At the meeting of the Assembly of the League of
Nations on the 24th September 1927, all the dele-
gations then present (including the German, the
Italian, and the Japanese), unanimously adopted a
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declaration concerning wars of aggression. The
preamble to the declaration stated:
"The Assembly: Recognizing the solidarity which unites the
community of nations;
Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of general
peace;
Being convinced that a war of aggression can never serve as
a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime * * *."
The unanimous resolution of the 18th February
1928, of 21 American republics at the sixth (Havana)
Pan-American Conference, declared that "war of
aggression constitutes an international crime against
the human species."
All these expressions of opinion, and others that
could be cited, so solemnly made, reinforce the con-
struction which the Tribunal placed upon the Pact
of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not
merely illegal, but is criminal. The prohibition of
aggressive war demanded by the conscience of the
world, finds its expression in the series of Pacts and
Treaties to which the Tribunal has just referred.
It is also important to remember that Article 227
of the Treaty of Versailles provided for the con-
stitution of a special tribunal, composed of repre-
sentatives of five of the Allied and Associated Powers
which had been belligerents in the First World War
opposed to Germany, to try the former German
Emperor "for a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties." The purpose
of this trial was expressed to be "to vindicate the
solemn obligations of international undertakings,
and the validity of international morality." In
Article 228 of the Treaty, the German Government
expressly recognized the right of the Allied Powers
"to bring before military tribunals persons accused
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of having committed acts in violation of the laws
and customs of war."
It was submitted that international law is con-
cerned with the actions of sovereign States, and
provides no punishment for individuals; and further,
that where the act in question is an act of State, those
who carry it out are not personally responsible, but
are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of
the State. In the opinion of the Tribunal, both
these submissions must be rejected. That interna-
tional law imposes duties and liabilities upon in-
dividuals as well as upon states has long been re-
cognized. In the recent case of Ex parte Quirin
(1942, 317 U. S. 1), before the Supreme Court of the
United States, persons were charged during the war
with landing in the United States for purposes of
spying and sabotage. The late Chief Justice Stone,
speaking for the court, said:
"From the very beginning of its history this Court has applied
the law of war as including that part of the law of nations which
prescribes for the conduct of war, the status, rights, and duties
of enemy nations as well as enemy individuals."
He went on to give a list of cases tried by the courts,
where individual offenders were charged with offences
against the laws of nations, and particularly the
laws of war. Many other authorities could be cited,
but enough has been said to show that individuals
can be punished for violations of international law.
Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing
individuals who commit such crimes can the pro-
visions of international law be enforced.
The provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of
Versailles already referred to illustrate and enforce
this view of individual responsibility.
The principle of international law, which under
certain circumstances, protects the representatives
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of a State, cannot be applied to acts which are
condemned as criminal by international law. The
authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves
behind their official position in order to be freed
from punishment in appropriate proceedings. Ar-
ticle 7 of the Charter expressly declares:
"The official position of defendants, whether as heads of State,
or responsible officials in government departments, shall not be
considered as freeing them from responsibility, or mitigating
punishment."
On the other hand the very essence of the Charter
is that individuals have international duties which
transcend the national obligations of obedience im-
posed by the individual State. He who violates the
laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the State if the State
in authorizing action moves outside its competence
under international law.
It was also submitted on behalf of most of these
defendants that in doing what they did they were
acting under the orders of Hitler, and therefore
cannot be held responsible for the acts committed
by them in carrying out these orders. The Charter
specifically provides in Article 8
:
"The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsi-
bility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment."
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with
the law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered
to kill or torture in violation of the international law
of war has never been recognized as a defense to such
acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here pro-
vides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the
punishment. The true test, which is found in varying
degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not the
existence of the order, but whether moral choice was
in fact possible.
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The Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy
In the previous recital of the facts relating to
aggressive war, it is clear that planning and prep-
aration had been carried out in the most systematic
way at every stage of the history.
Planning and preparation are essential to the mak-
ing of war. In the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive
war is a crime under international law. The Charter
defines this offense as planning, preparation, initi-
ation, or waging of a war of aggression "or partici-
pation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment ... of the foregoing." The indict-
ment follows this distinction. Count one charges the
common plan or conspiracy. Count two charges the
planning and waging of war. The same evidence has
been introduced to support both counts. We shall
therefore discuss both counts together, as they are in
substance the same. The defendants have been
charged under both counts, and their guilt under
each count must be determined.
The "common plan or conspiracy" charged in the
indictment covers 25 years, from the formation of
the Nazi Party in 1919 to the end of the war in 1945.
The party is spoken of as "the instrument of cohesion
among the defendants" for carrying out the purposes
of the conspiracy—the overthrowing of the Treaty of
Versailles, acquiring territory lost by Germany in the
last war and "lebensraum" in Europe, by the use, if
necessary, of armed force, of aggressive war. The
"seizure of power" by the Nazis, the use of terror,
the destruction of trade unions, the attack on
Christian teaching and on churches, the persecution
of the Jews, the regimentation of youth—all these
are said to be steps deliberately taken to carry out
the common plan. It found expression, so it is
alleged, in secret rearmament, the withdrawal by
Germany from the Disarmament Conference and the
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League of Nations, universal military service, and
seizure of the Rhineland. Finally, according to the
indictment, aggressive action was planned and carried
out against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1936-38,
followed by the planning and waging of war against
Poland; and, successively, against ten other countries.
The prosecution says, in effect, that any significant
participation in the affairs of the Nazi Party or
government is evidence of a participation in a
conspiracy that is in itself criminal. Conspiracy is
not defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the
Tribunal the conspiracy must be clearly outlined in
its criminal purpose. It must not be too far removed
from the time of decision and of action. The plan-
ning, to be criminal, must not rest merely on the
declarations of a party program, such as are found in
the 25 points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920,
or the political affirmations expressed in "Mein
Kampf" in later years. The tribunal must examine
whether a concrete plan to wage war existed, and
determine the participants in that concrete plan.
It is not necessary to decide whether a single master
conspiracy between the defendants has been estab-
lished by the evidence. The seizure of power by the
Nazi Party, and the subsequent domination by the
Nazi State of all spheres of economic and social life
must of course be remembered when the later plans
for waging war are examined. That plans were
made to wage wars, as early as November 5, 1937,
and probably before that, is apparent. And there-
after, such preparations continued in many directions,
and against the peace of many countries. Indeed
the threat of war—and war itself if necessary—was
an integral part of the Nazi policy. But the evidence
establishes with certainty the existence of many
separate plans rather than a single conspiracy em-
bracing them all. That Germany was rapidly moving
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to complete dictatorship from the moment that the
Nazis seized power, and progressively in the direction
of war, has been overwhelmingly shown in the ordered
sequence of aggressive acts and wars already set out
in this judgment.
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the evidence
establishes the common planning to prepare and
wage war by certain of the defendants. It is immate-
rial to consider whether a single conspiracy to the
extent and over the time set out in the indictment
has been conclusively proved. Continued planning,
with aggressive war as the objective, has been estab-
lished beyond doubt. The truth of the situation was
well stated by Paul Schmidt, official interpreter of
the German Foreign Office, as follows:
"The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent
from the start, namely the domination of the European Con-
tinent, to be achieved first by the incorporation of all German-
speaking groups in the Reich, and, secondly, by territorial expan-
sion under the slogan "Lebensraum." The execution of these
basic objectives, however, seemed to be characterized by
improvisation. Each succeeding step was apparently carried
out as each new situation arose, but all consistent with the
ultimate objectives mentioned above."
The argument that such common planning cannot
exist where there is complete dictatorship is unsound.
A plan in the execution of which a number of persons
participate is still a plan, even though conceived by
only one of them; and those who execute the plan do
not avoid responsibility by showing that they acted
under the direction of the man who conceived it.
Hitler could not make aggressive war by himself.
He had to have the cooperation of statesmen, military
leaders, diplomats, and businessmen. When they,
with knowledge of his aims, gave him their coopera-
tion, they made themselves parties to the plan he had
initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent
because Hitler made use of them, if they knew what
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they were doing. That they were assigned to their
tasks by a dictator does not absolve them from
responsibility for their acts. The relation of leader
and follower does not preclude responsibility here
any more than it does in the comparable tyranny
of organized domestic crime.
Count one, however, charges not only the con-
spiracy to commit aggressive war, but also to commit
war crimes and crimes against humanity. But the
Charter does not define as a separate crime any
conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive
war. Article 6 of the Charter provides :
"Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices partici-
pating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such
plan."
In the opinion of the Tribunal, these words do not
add a new and separate crime to those already listed.
The words are designed to establish the responsibility
of persons participating in a common plan. The
Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in
count one that the defendants conspired to commit
war crimes and crimes against humanity, and will
consider only the common plan to prepare, initiate,
and wage aggressive war.
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
The evidence relating to war crimes has been
overwhelming, in its volume and its detail. It is
impossible for this judgment adequately to review it,
or to record the mass of documentary and oral
evidence that has been presented. The truth remains
that war crimes were committed on a vast scale,
never before seen in the history of war. They were
perpetrated in all the countries occupied by Germany,
and on the high sea.s, and were attended by every
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conceivable circumstance of cruelty and horror.
There can be no doubt that the majority of them
arose from the Nazi conception of "total war,"
with which the aggressive wars were waged. For in
this conception of "total war" the moral ideas
underlying the conventions which seek to make war
more humane are no longer regarded as having force
or validity. Everything is made subordinate to the
overmastering dictates of war. Rules, regulations,
assurances, and treaties, all alike, are of no moment;
and so, freed from the restraining influence of inter-
national law, the aggressive war is conducted by the
Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way. Accordingly,
war crimes were committed when and wherever the
Fuehrer and his close associates thought them to be ad-
vantageous. They were for the most part the result
of cold and criminal calculation.
On some occasions war crimes were deliberately
planned long in advance. In the case of the Soviet
Union, the plunder of the territories to be occupied,
and the ill-treatment of the civilian population, were
settled in minute detail before the attack was begun.
As early as the autumn of 1940, the invasion of the
territories of the Soviet Union was being considered.
From that date onwards, the methods to be employed
in destroying all possible opposition were continu-
ously under discussion.
Similarly, when planning to exploit the inhabitants
of the occupied countries for slave labor on the very
greatest scale, the German Government conceived it
as an integral part of the war economy, and planned
and organized this particular war crime down to the
last elaborate detail.
Other war crimes, such as the murder of prisoners
of war who had escaped and been recaptured, or the
murder of commandos or captured airmen, or the
destruction of the Soviet commissars, were the result
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of direct orders circulated through the highest official
channels.
The Tribunal proposes, therefore, to deal quite
generally with the question of war crimes, and to
refer to them later when examining the responsibility
of the individual defendants in relation to them.
Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and
murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established
rules of international law, but in complete disregard
of the elementary dictates of humanity. Civilian
populations in occupied territories suffered the same
fate. Whole populations were deported to Germany
for the purposes of slave labor upon defense works,
armament production and similar tasks connected
with war effort. Hostages were taken in very large
numbers from the civilian populations in all the
occupied countries, and were shot as suited the Ger-
man purposes. Public and private property was
systematically plundered and pillaged in order to
enlarge the resources of Germany at the expense of
the rest of Europe. Cities and towns and villages
were wantonly destroyed without military justifica-
tion or necessity.
(A) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF
WAR
Article 6 (b) of the Charter defines war crimes in
these words
:
"War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other pur-
pose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing
of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton de-
struction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified
by military necessity."
In the course of the war, many Allied soldiers who
had surrendered to the Germans were shot immedi-
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ately, often as a matter of deliberate, calculated
policy. On the 18th October 1942, the defendant
Keitel circulated a directive authorized by Hitler,
which ordered that all members of Allied "com-
mando" units, often when in uniform and whether
armed or not, were to be "slaughtered to the last
man," even if they attempted to surrender. It was
further provided that if such Allied troops came into
the hands of the military authorities after being first
captured by the local police, or in any other way,
they should be handed over immediately to the SD.
This order was supplemented from time to time, and
was effective throughout the remainder of the war,
although after the Allied landings in Normandy in
1944 it was made clear that the order did not apply
to "commandos" captured within the immediate
battle area. Under the provisions of this order,
Allied "commando" troops, and other military units
operating independently, lost their lives in Norway,
France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Many of them
were killed on the spot, and in no case were those
who were executed later in concentration camps ever
given a trial of any kind. For example, an American
military mission which landed behind the German
front in the Balkans in January 1945, numbering
about 12 to IS men and wearing uniform, were taken
to Mauthausen under the authority of this order,
and according to the affidavit of Adolf Zutte, the
adjutant of the Mauthausen Concentration Camp,
all of them were shot.
In March 1944 the OKH issued the "Kugel" or
"Bullet" decree, which directed that every escaped
officer and NCO prisoner of war who had not been
put to work, with the exception of British and Amer-
ican prisoners of war, should on recapture be handed
over to the SIPO and SD. This order was distributed
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by the SIPO and SD to their regional offices. These
escaped officers and NCOs were to be sent to the
concentration camp at Mauthausen, to be executed
upon arrival, by means of a bullet shot in the neck.
In March 1944, 50 officers of the British Royal
Air Force, who escaped from the camp at Sagan
where they were confined as prisoners, were shot on
recapture, on the direct orders of Hitler. Their
bodies were immediately cremated, and the urns con-
taining their ashes were returned to the camp. It
was not contended by the defendants that this was
other than plain murder, in complete violation of
international law.
When Allied airmen were forced to land in Ger-
many they were sometimes killed at once by the
civilian population. The police were instructed not
to interfere with these killings, and the Ministry of
Justice was informed that no one should be prose-
cuted for taking part in them.
The treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was
characterized by particular inhumanity. The death
of so many of them was not due merely to the action
of individual guards, or to the exigencies of life in the
camps. It was the result of systematic plans to
murder. More than a month before the German
invasion of the Soviet Union the OKW were making
special plans for dealing with political representa-
tives serving with the Soviet armed forces who might
be captured. One proposal was that "political
Commissars of the army are not recognized as
prisoners of war, and are to be liquidated at the
latest in the transient prisoner of war camps." The
defendant Keitel gave evidence that instructions
incorporating this proposal were issued to the Ger-
man army.
On the 8th September 1941, regulations for the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war in all prisoner
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of war camps were issued, signed by General Reinecke,
the head of the prisoner of war department of the
high command. These orders stated:
"The Bolshevist soldier has therefore lost all claim to
treatment as an honorable opponent, in accordance with
the Geneva Convention * * * The order for ruthless
and energetic action must be given at the slightest indica-
tion of insubordination, especially in the case of Bolshe-
vist fanatics. Insubordination, active or passive resist-
ance, must be broken immediately by force of arms (bayo-
nets, butts, and firearms) * * * Anyone carrying out
the order who does not use his weapons, or does so with
insufficient energy, is punishable * * * Prisoners of
war attempting escape are to be fired on without previous
challenge. No warning shot must ever be fired * * *
The use of arms against prisoners of war is as a rule legal."
The Soviet prisoners of war were left without suitable
clothing; the wounded without medical care; they
were starved, and in many cases left to die.
On the 17th July 1941, the Gestapo issued an
order providing for the killing of all Soviet prisoners
of war who were or might be dangerous to National
Socialism. * * *
In some cases Soviet prisoners of war were branded
with a special permanent mark. There was put in
evidence the OKW order dated the 20th July 1942,
which laid down that:
"The brand is to take the shape of an acute angle of about 45
degrees, with the long side to be 1 cm. in length, pointing up-
wards and burnt on the left buttock * * * This brand is
made with the aid of a lancet available in any military unit.
The coloring used is Chinese ink."
The carrying out of this order was the responsibility
of the military authorities, though it was widely
circulated by the chief of the SIPO and the SD to
German police officials for information.
Soviet prisoners of war were also made the subject
of medical experiments of the most cruel and in-
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human kind. In July 1943, experimental work was
begun in preparation for a campaign of bacteriological
warfare; Soviet prisoners of war were used in these
medical experiments, which more often than not
proved fatal. In connection with this campaign for
bacteriological warfare, preparations were also made
for the spreading of bacterial emulsions from planes,
with the object of producing widespread failures of
crops and consequent starvation. These measures
were never applied, possibly because of the rapid
deterioration of Germany's military position.
The argument in defense of the charge with regard
to the murder and ill-treatment of Soviet prisoners
of war, that the USSR was not a party to the Geneva
Convention, is quite without foundation. On the
15th September 1941, Admiral Canaris protested
against the regulations for the treatment of Soviet
prisoners of war, signed by General Reinecke on the
8th September 1941. He then stated:
"The Geneva Convention for the treatment of prisoners of
war is not binding in the relationship between Germany and
the USSR. Therefore only the principles of general inter-
national law on the treatment of prisoners of war apply. Since
the 18th century these have gradually been established along
the lines that war captivity is neither revenge nor punishment,
but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to
prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the
war. This principle was developed in accordance with the
view held by all armies that it is contrary to military tradition
to kill or injure helpless people . . . The decrees for the
treatment of Soviet prisoners of war enclosed are based on a
fundamentally different view-point."
This protest, which correctly stated the legal posi-
tion, was ignored. The defendant Keitel made a
note on this memorandum:
"The objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous
warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I
approve and back the measures."
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(B) MURDER AND ILL-TREATMENT OF CIVILIAN
POPULATION
Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that "ill-treat-
ment * * * of civilian population of or in occu-
pied territory * * * killing of hostages * * *
wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages" shall
be a war crime. In the main, these provisions are
merely declaratory of the existing laws of war as ex-
pressed by the Hague Convention, Article 46, which
stated
:
"Family honor and rights, the lives of persons and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be
respected."
The territories occupied by Germany were admin-
istered in violation of the laws of war. The evidence
is quite overwhelming of a systematic rule of violence,
brutality, and terror. On the 7th December 1941,
Hitler issued the directive since known as the "Nacht
und Nebel Erlass" (night and fog decree), under
which persons who committed offenses against the
Reich or the German forces in occupied territories,
except where the death sentence was certain, were
to be taken secretly to Germany and handed over to
the SIPO and SD for trial or punishment in Germany.
This decree was signed by the defendant Keitel.
After these civilians arrived in Germany, no word of
them was permitted to reach the country from which
they came, or their relatives ; even in cases when they
died awaiting trial the families were not informed,
the purpose being to create anxiety in the minds of
the family of the arrested person. Hitler's purpose
in issuing this decree was stated by the defendant
Keitel in a covering letter, dated 12 December 1941,
to be as follows
:
"Efficient and enduring intimidation can only be achieved
either by capital punishment or by measures by which the rela-
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tives of the criminal and the population do not know the fate of
the criminal. This aim is achieved when the criminal is trans-
ferred to Germany."
Even persons who were only suspected of opposing
any of the policies of the German occupation author-
ities were arrested, and on arrest were interrogated
by the Gestapo and the SD in the most shameful
manner. On the 12th June 1942, the chief of the
SIPO and SD published, through Mueller, the
Gestapo chief, an order authorizing the use of "third
degree" methods of interrogation, where preliminary
investigation had indicated that the person could
give information on important matters, such as
subversive activities, though not for the purpose of
extorting confessions of the prisoner's own crimes.
This order provided:
"* * * Third degree may, under this supposition, only be
employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah's Witnesses,
saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, para-
chute agents, antisocial elements, Polish or Soviet Russian
loafers or tramps; in all other cases my permission must first be
obtained * * * Third degree can, according to circum-
stances, consist amongst other methods of very simple diet
(bread and water), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep,
exhaustive drilling, also in flogging (for more than twenty
strokes a doctor must be consulted)."
The brutal suppression of all opposition to the
German occupation was not confined to severe meas-
ures against suspected members of resistance move-
ments themselves, but was also extended to their
families. On the 19th July 1944, the commander of
the SIPO and SD in the district of Radom, in
Poland, published an order, transmitted through the
higher SS and police leaders, to the effect that in all
cases of assassination or attempted assassination of
Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital
installations, not only the guilty person, but also
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all his or her male relatives should be shot, and female
relatives over 16 years of age put into a concentra-
tion camp. * * *
The practice of keeping hostages to prevent and to
punish any form of civil disorder was resorted to by
the Germans; an order issued by the defendant Keitel
on the 16th September 1941, spoke in terms of fifty
or a hundred lives from the occupied areas of the
Soviet Union for one German life taken. The order
stated that "it should be remembered that a human
life in unsettled countries frequently counts for
nothing, and a deterrent effect can be obtained only
by unusual severity." The exact number of persons
killed as a result of this policy is not known, but
large numbers were killed in France and the other
occupied territories in the west, while in the east the
slaughter was on an even more extensive scale. In
addition to the killing of hostages, entire towns were
destroyed in some cases; such massacres as those of
Oradour-sur-Glane in France and Lidice in Czecho-
slovakia, both of which were described to the Tribunal
in detail, are examples of the organized use of terror
by the occupying forces to beat down and destroy all
opposition to their rule.
One of the most notorious means of terrorizing the
people in occupied territories was the use of concen-
tration camps. They were first established in Ger-
many at the moment of the seizure of power by the
Nazi Government. Their original purpose was to
imprison without trial all those persons who were
opposed to the Government, or who were in any way
obnoxious to German authority. With the aid of a
secret police force, this practice was widely extended,
and in course of time concentration camps became
places of organized and systematic murder, where
millions of people were destroyed.
In the administration of the occupied territories the
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concentration camps were used to destroy all oppo-
sition groups. The persons arrested by the Ges-
tapo were as a rule sent to concentration camps.
They were conveyed to the camps in many cases
without any care whatever being taken for them,
and great numbers died on the way. Those who
arrived at the camp were subject to systematic
cruelty. They were given hard physical labor,
inadequate food, clothes, and shelter, and were
subject at all times to the rigors of a soulless regime,
and the private whims of individual guards. * * *
A certain number of the concentration camps were
equipped with gas chambers for the wholesale de-
struction of the inmates, and with furnaces for the
burning of the bodies. Some of them were, in fact,
used for the extermination of Jews as part of the
"final solution" of the Jewish problem. Most of the
non-Jewish inmates were used for labor, although the
conditions under which they worked made labor
and death almost synonymous terms. Those in-
mates who became ill and were unable to work were
either destroyed in the gas chambers or sent to special
infirmaries, where they were given entirely inade-
quate medical treatment, worse food, if possible, than
the working inmates, and left to die.
The murder and ill-treatment of civilian popula-
tions reached its height in the treatment of the
citizens of the Soviet Union and Poland. * * *
The foregoing crimes against the civilian popula-
tion are sufficiently appalling, and yet the evidence
shows that at any rate in the east, the mass murders
and cruelties were not committed solely for the
purpose of stamping out opposition or resistance to
the German occupying forces. In Poland and the
Soviet Union these crimes were part of a plan to
get rid of whole native populations by expulsion and
annihilation, in order that their territory could be
275
used for colonization by Germans. Hitler had
written in "Mein Kampf" on these lines, and the
plan was clearly stated by Himmler in July 1942,
when he wrote:
"It is not our task to Germanize the east in the old sense, that
is to teach the people there the German language and the Ger-
man law, but to see to it that only people of purely Germanic
blood live in the east."
(C) PILLAGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
Article 49 of the Hague Convention provides that
an occupying power may levy a contribution of
money from the occupied territory to pay for the
needs of the army of occupation, and for the ad-
ministration of the territory in question. Article 52
of the Hague Convention provides that an occupying
power may make requisitions in kind only for the
needs of the army of occupation, and that these
requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources
of the country. These Articles, together with Article
48, dealing with the expenditure of money collected
in taxes, and Articles S3, 55, and 56, dealing with
public property, make it clear that under the rules
of war, the economy of an occupied country can only
be required to bear the expense of the occupation,
and these should not be greater than the economy of
the country can reasonably be expected to bear.
Article 56 reads as follows:
"The property of municipalities, of religious, charitable,
educational, artistic, and scientiiic institutions, although be-
longing to the State, is to be accorded the same standing as
private property. All premeditated seizure, destruction or
damage of such institutions, historical monuments, works of
art, and science, is prohibited and should be prosecuted.
"
The evidence in this case has established, however,
that the territories occupied by Germany were
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exploited for the German war effort in the most
ruthless way, without consideration of the local
economy, and in consequence of a deliberate design
and policy. There was in truth a systematic "plunder
of public or private property," which was criminal
under Article 6 (b) of the Charter. * * *
(D) SLAVE LABOR POLICY
Article 6 (b) of the Charter provides that the "ill-
treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any
other purpose, of civilian population of or in occupied
territory" shall be a war crime. The laws relating
to forced labor by the inhabitants of occupied terri-
tories are found in Article 52 of the Hague Conven-
tion, which provides:
"Requisition in kind and services shall not be demanded from
municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army
of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of
the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabi-
tants in the obligation of taking part in military operations
against their own country."
The policy of the German occupation authorities was
in flagrant violation of the terms of this convention.
Some idea of this policy may be gathered from the
statement made by Hitler in a speech on November
9, 1941 : *
"The territory which now works for us contains more than
250,000,000 men, but the territory which works indirectly for us
includes now more than 350,000,000. In the measure in which
it concerns German territory, the domain which we have taken
under our administration, it is not doubtful that we shall succeed
in harnessing the very last man to this work."
The actual results achieved were not so complete as
this, but the German occupation authorities did suc-
ceed in forcing many of the inhabitants of the occu-
pied territories to work for the German war effort,
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and in deporting at least 5,000,000 person to Ger-
many to serve German industry and agriculture.
In the early stages of the war, manpower in the
occupied territories was under the control of various
occupation authorities, and the procedure varied
from country to country. In all the occupied terri-
tories compulsory labor service was promptly insti-
tuted. Inhabitants of the occupied countries were
conscripted and compelled to work in local occupa-
tions, to assist the German war economy. In many
cases they were forced to work on German fortifica-
tions and military installations. As local supplies of
raw materials and local industrial capacity became
inadequate to meet the German requirements, the
system of deporting laborers to Germany was put
into force. By the middle of April 1940 compulsory
deportation of laborers to Germany had been ordered
in the Government General; and a similar procedure
was followed in other eastern territories as they were
occupied. * * *
(E) PERSECUTION OF THE JEWS
The persecution of the Jews at the hands of the
Nazi Government has been proved in the greatest
detail before the Tribunal. It is a record of consistent
and systematic inhumanity on the greatest scale.
Ohlendorf, chief of Amt III in the RSHA from 1939
to 1943, and who was in command of one of the
Einsatz groups in the campaign against the Soviet
Union testified as to the methods employed in the
extermination of the Jews. He said that he employed
firing squads to shoot the victims in order to lessen
the sense of individual guilt on the part of his men;
and the 90,000 men, women, and children who were
murdered in 1 year by his particular group were
mostly Jews.
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When the witness Bach-Zelewski was asked how
Ohlendorf could admit the murder of 90,000 people,
he replied:
"I am of the opinion that when, for years, for decades, the
doctrine is preached that the Slav race is an inferior race, and
Jews not even human, then such an outcome is inevitable. ,,
But the defendant Frank spoke the final words of
this chapter of Nazi history when he testified in
this court:
"We have fought against Jewry; we have fought against it
for years; and we have allowed ourselves to make utterances and
my own diary has become a witness against me in this connec-
tion—utterances which are terrible * * *.A thousand
years will pass and this guilt of Germany will still not be
erased."
The anti-Jewish policy was formulated in point
4 of the party program which declared, "Only a
member of the race can be a citizen. A member of
the race can only be one who is of German blood,
without consideration of creed. Consequently, no
Jew can be a member of the race." Other points of
the program declared that Jews should be treated as
foreigners, that they should not be permitted to hold
public office, that they should be expelled from the
Reich if it were impossible to nourish the entire
population of the State, that they should be denied
any further immigration into Germany, and that
they should be prohibited from publishing German
newspapers. The Nazi Party preached these doc-
trines throughout its history. "Der Stuerner" and
other publications were allowed to disseminate
hatred of the Jews, and in the speeches and public
declarations of the Nazi leaders, the Jews were held
up to public ridicule and contempt.
With the seizure of power, the persecution of the
Jews was intensified. A series of discriminatory laws
was passed, which limited the offices and professions
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permitted to Jews; and restrictions were placed on
their family life and their rights of citizenship.
By the autumn of 1938, the Nazi policy toward the
Jews had reached the stage where it was directed
toward the complete exclusion of Jews from German
life. Pogroms were organized, which included the
burning and demolishing of synagogues, the looting
of Jewish businesses, and the arrest of prominent
Jewish businessmen. A collective fine of 1 billion
marks was imposed on the Jews, the seizure of Jewish
assets was authorized, and the movement of Jews
was restricted by regulations to certain specified
districts and hours. The creation of ghettoes was
carried out on an extensive scale, and by an order of
the security police Jews were compelled to wear a
yellow star to be worn on the breast and back.
It was contended for the prosecution that certain
aspects of this anti-Semitic policy were connected
with the plans for aggressive war. The violent
measures taken against the Jews in November 1938
were nominally in retaliation for the killing of an
official of the German Embassy in Paris. But the
decision to seize Austria and Czechoslovakia had
been made a year before. The imposition of a fine of
1 billion marks was made, and the confiscation of the
financial holdings of the Jews was decreed, at a time
when German armament expenditure had put the
German treasury in difficulties, and when the reduc-
tion of expenditure on armaments was being con-
sidered. These steps were taken, moreover, with the
approval of the defendant Goering, who had been
given responsibility for economic matters of this
kind, and who was the strongest advocate of an
extensive rearmament program notwithstanding the
financial difficulties. * * *
The Nazi persecution of Jews in Germany before
the war, severe and repressive as it was, cannot com-
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pare, however, with the policy pursued during the
war in the occupied territories. Originally the
policy was similar to that which had been in force
inside Germany. Jews were required to register,
were forced to live in ghettoes, to wear the yellow
star, and were used as slave laborers. In the sum-
mer of 1941, however, plans were made for the "final
solution" of the Jewish question in Europe. This
"final solution" meant the extermination of the Jews,
which early in 1939 Hitler had threatened would be
one of the consequences of an outbreak of war, and a
special section in the Gestapo under Adolf Eichmann,
as head of section B-4. of the Gestapo, was formed to
carry out the policy.
The plan for exterminating the Jews was developed
shortly after the attack on the Soviet Union. Ein-
satzgruppen of the security police and SD, formed for
the purpose of breaking the resistance of the popula-
tion of the areas lying behind the German armies in
the east, were given the duty of exterminating the
Jews in those areas. The effectiveness of the work
of the Einsatzgruppen is shown by the fact that in
February 1942, Heydrich was able to report that
Esthonia had already been cleared of Jews and that
in Riga the number of Jews had been reduced from
29,500 to 2,500. Altogether the Einsatzgruppen
operating in the occupied Baltic States killed over
135,000 Jews in 3 months.
Nor did these special units operate completely
independently of the German armed forces. There
is clear evidence that leaders of the Einsatzgruppen
obtained the cooperation of army commanders. In
one case the relations between an Einsatzgruppe and
the military authorities was described at the time as
being "very close, almost cordial"; in another case
the smoothness of an Einsatzcommando's operation
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was attributed to the "understanding for this pro-
cedure" shown by the army authorities. * * *
(F) THE LAW RELATING TO WAR CRIMES AND
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
[After quoting Article 6 (b) and (c) of the Charter,
the Tribunal continued:]
* * * The Tribunal is of course bound by the
Charter, in the definition which it gives both of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. With respect
to war crimes, however, as has already been pointed
out, the crimes defined by Article 6, section (b), of
the Charter were already recognized as war crimes
under international law. They were covered by
Articles 46, 50, 52, and 56 of the Hague Convention
of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46, and 51 of the Geneva
Convention of 1929. That violation of these pro-
visions constituted crimes for which the guilty indi-
viduals were punishabletis too well settled to admit
of argument.
But is is argued that the Hague Convention does
not apply in this case, because of the "general par-
ticipation" clause in Article 2 of the Hague Conven-
tion of 1907. That clause provided:
"The provisions contained in the regulations (rules of land
warfare) referred to in Article I as well as in the present con-
vention do not apply except between contracting powers, and
then only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention."
Several of the belligerents in the recent war were not
parties to this convention.
In the opinion of the Tribunal it is not necessary
to decide this question. The rules of land warfare
expressed in the convention undoubtedly represented
an advance over existing international law at the
time of their adoption. But the convention expressly
stated that it was an attempt "to revise the general
laws and customs of war," which it thus recognized
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to be then existing, but by 1939 these rules laid down
in the convention were recognized by all civilized
nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of
the laws and customs of war which are referred to in
Article 6 (b) of the Charter.
A further submission was made that Germany was
no longer bound by the rules of land warfare in many
of the territories occupied during the war, because
Germany had completely subjugated those coun-
tries and incorporated them into the German Reich,
a fact which gave Germany authority to deal with
the occupied countries as though they were part of
Germany. In the view of the Tribunal it is unneces-
sary in this case to decide whether this doctrine of
subjugation, dependent as it is upon military con-
quest, has any application where the subjugation is
the result of the crime of aggressive war. The doc-
trine was never considered to be applicable so long as
there was an army in the fl^ld attempting to restore
the occupied countries to their true owners, and in
this case, therefore, the doctrine could not apply to
any territories occupied after the 1st September 1939.
As to the war crimes committed in Bohemia and
Moravia, it is a sufficient answer that these territories
were never added to the Reich, bur a mere protecto-
rate was established over them.
With regard to crimes against humanity, there is
no doubt whatever that political opponents were
murdered in Germany before the war, and that many
of them were kept in concentration camps in circum-
stances of great horror and cruelty. The policy of
terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and
in many cases was organized and systematic. The
policy of persecution, repression, and murder of
civilians in Germany before the war of 1939, who
were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most
ruthlessly carried out. The persecution of Jews
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during the same period is established beyond all
doubt. To constitute crimes against humanity, the
acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have
been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The Tri-
bunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible
as many of these crimes were, it has not been satis-
factorily proved that they were done in execution of,
or in connection with, any such crime. The Tri-
bunal therefore cannot make a general declaration
that the acts before 1939 were crimes against hu-
manity within the meaning of the Charter, but
from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes
were committed on a vast scale, which were also
crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane
acts charged in the indictment, and committed after
the beginning of the war, did not constitute war
crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or
in connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore
constituted crimes against humanity.
The Accused Organizations
[After referring to Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter,
the Tribunal continued
:]
* * * The effect of the declaration of criminali-
ty by the Tribunal is well illustrated by law No. 10
of the Control Council of Germany passed on the
20th day of December 1945, which provides:
"Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime:*****
"(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organi-
zation declared criminal by the International Military Tribunal.*****
"(3) Any person found guilty of any of the crimes above men-
tioned may upon conviction be punished as shall be determined
777534—48 19
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by the Tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of
one or more of the following:
(a) Death.
(b) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without
hard labor.
(c) Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labor, in
lieu thereof."
In effect, therefore, a member of an organization
which the Tribunal has declared to be criminal may
be subsequently convicted of the crime of member-
ship and be punished for that crime by death. This
is not to assume that international or military courts
which will try these individuals will not exercise
appropriate standards of justice. This is a far-
reaching and novel procedure. Its application, un-
less properly safeguarded, may produce great in-
justice.
Article 9, it should be noted, uses the words "The
Tribunal may declare," so that the Tribunal is
vested with discretion as to whether it will declare
any organization criminal. This discretion is a
judicial one and does not permit arbitrary action,
but should be exercised in accordance with well-
settled legal principles, one of the most important
of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that
mass punishments should be avoided. If satisfied
of the criminal guilt of any organization or group,
this Tribunal should not hesitate to declare it to be
criminal because the theory of "group criminality"
is new, or because it might be unjustly applied by
some subsequent tribunals. On the other hand, the
Tribunal should make such declaration of criminality
so far as possible in a manner to insure that innocent:
persons will not be punished.
A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal,
conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation
for criminal purposes. There must be a group-
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bound together and organized for a common purpose.
The group must be formed or used in connection
with the commission of crimes denounced by the
Charter. Since the declaration with respect to the
organizations and groups will, as has been pointed
out, fix the criminality of its members, that definition
should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the
criminal purposes or acts of the organization and
those who were drafted by the State for member-
ship, unless they were personally implicated in the-
commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6
of the Charter as members of the organization.
Membership alone is not enough to come within the
scope of these declarations.
Since declarations of criminality which the Tri-
bunal makes will be used by other courts in the trial
of persons on account of their membership in the
organizations found to be criminal, the Tribunal feels
it appropriate to make the following recommenda-
tions :
1. That so far as possible throughout the four
zones of occupation in Germany the classifications,
sanctions, and penalties be standardized. Uniformity
of treatment so far as practical should be a basic-
principle. This does not, of course, mean that
discretion in sentencing should not be vested in the
court; but the discretion should be within fixed
limits appropriate to the nature of the crime.
2. Law No. 10, to which reference has already been
made, leaves punishment entirely in the discretion
of the trial court even to the extent of inflicting the
death penalty.
The de-Nazification law of March 5, 1946, how-
ever, passed for Bavaria, Greater-Hesse, and Wuert-
temberg-Baden, provides definite sentences for pun-
ishment in each type of offense. The Tribunal
recommends that in no case should punishment im—
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posed under law No. 10 upon any members of an
organization or group declared by the Tribunal to
be criminal exceed the punishment fixed by the de-
Nazification law. No person should be punished
under both laws.
3. The Tribunal recommends to the Control
Council that law No. 10 be amended to prescribe
limitations on the punishment which may be im-
posed for membership in a criminal group or organiza-
tion so that such punishment shall not exceed the
punishment prescribed by the de-Nazification law.
The indictment asks that the Tribunal declare
to be criminal the following organizations: The
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Tarty; the Gestapo;
the SD; the SS; the SA; the Reich Cabinet, and the
General Staff and High Command of the German
Armed Forces. . . .
(A) THE LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY
* * * Conclusion.—The Leadership Corps was
used for purposes which were criminal under the Char-
ter and involved the Germanization of incorporated
territory, the persecution of the Jews, the administra-
tion of the slave labor program, and the mistreatment
of prisoners of war. The defendants Bormann and
Sauckel, who were members of this organization,
were among those who used it for these purposes.
The Gauleiters, the Kreisleiters, and the Ortsgrup-
penleiters participated, to one degree or another, in
these criminal programs. The Reichsleitung as the
staff organization of the party is also responsible
for these criminal programs as well as the heads of
the various staff organizations of the Gauleiters and
Kreisleiters. The decision of the Tribunal on these
staff organizations includes only the Amtsleiters who
were heads of offices on the staffs of the Reichsleitung,
Gauleitung, and Kreisleitung. With respect to other
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staff officers and party organizations attached to the
Leadership Corps other than the Amtsleiters referred
to above, the Tribunal will follow the suggestion of the
prosecution in excluding them from the declaration.
The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the
meaning of the Charter the group composed of those
members of the Leadership Corps holding the posi-
tions enumerated in the preceding paragraph who
became or remained members of the organization with
knowledge that it was being used for the commission
of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter,
or who were personally implicated as members of the
organization in the commission of sucn crimes. The
basis of this finding is the participation of the organi-
zation in war crimes and crimes against humanity
connected with the war; the group declared criminal
cannot include, therefore, persons who had ceased
to hold the positions enumerated in the preceding
paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.
(B) GESTAPO AND SD
* * * Conclusion.—The Gestapo and SD were
used for purposes which were criminal under the
Charter involving the persecution and extermination
of the Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration
camps, excesses in the administration of occupied
territories, the administration of the slave labor
program, and the mistreatment and murder of pris-
oners of war. The defendant Kaltenbrunner, who
was a member of this organization, was among those
who used it for these purposes. In dealing with the
Gestapo the Tribunal includes all executive and
administrative officials of Amt IV of the RSHA or
concerned with Gestapo administration in other
departments of the RSHA and all local Gestapo
officials serving both inside and outside of Germany,
including the members of the frontier police, but not
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including the members of the border and customs
protection or the secret field police, except such
members as have been specified above. At the sug-
gestion of the prosecution the Tribunal does not
include persons employed by the Gestapo for purely
clerical, stenographic, janitorial, or similar unofficial
routine tasks. In dealing with the SD the Tribunal
includes Amter III, VI, and VII of the RSHA and all
other members of the SD, including all local repre-
sentatives and agents, honorary or otherwise, whether
they were technically members of the SS or not, but
not including honorary informers who were not mem-
bers of the SS, and members of the Abwehr who were
transferred to the SD.
The tribunal declares to be criminal within the
meaning of the charter the group composed of those
members of the Gestapo and SD holding the positions
enumerated in the preceding paragraph who became
or remained members of the organization with
knowledge that it was being used for the commission
of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter,
or who were personally implicated as members of the
organization in the commission of such crimes. The
basis for this finding is the participation of the
organization in war crimes and crimes against human-
ity connected with the war; this group declared
criminal cannot include, therefore, persons who had
ceased to hold the positions enumerated in the pre-
ceding paragraph prior to 1 September 1939.
(c) the ss
* * * Conclusions.—The SS was utilized for
purposes which were criminal under the Charter
involving the persecution and extermination of the
Jews, brutalities and killings in concentration camps,
excesses in the administration of occupied territories,
the administration of the slave labor program and the
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mistreatment and murder of prisoners of war. The
defendant Kaltenbrunner was a member of the SS
implicated in these activities. In dealing with the
SS the Tribunal includes all persons who have been
officially accepted as members of the SS including the
members of the Allgemeine SS, members of the Waffen
SS, members of the SS Totenkopf Verbaende and the
members of any of the different police forces who were
members of the SS. The Tribunal does not include
the so-called SS riding units. The Sicherheitsdienst
des Reichsfuehrer SS (commonly known as the SD) is
dealt with in the Tribunal's judgment on the Gestapo
and SD.
The Tribunal declares to be criminal within the
meaning of the Charter the group composed of those
persons who had been officially accepted as members
of the SS as enumerated in the preceding paragraph
who became or remained members of the organiza-
tion with knowledge that it was being used for the
commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of
the Charter, or who were personally implicated as
members of the organization in the commission of
such crimes, excluding, however, those who were
drafted into membership by the State in such a way
as to give them no choice in the matter, and who had
committed no such crimes. The basis of this finding
is the participation of the organization in war crimes
.and 'crimes against humanity connected with the war;
this group declared criminal cannot include, there-
fore, persons who had ceased to belong to the organi-
zations enumerated in the preceding paragraph prior
to 1 September 1939.
(D) THE SA
* * Conclusion.—Until the purge beginning
on June 30, 1934, the SA was a group composed in large
part of ruffians and bullies who participated in the
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Nazi outrages of that period. It has not been shown,
however, that these atrocities were part of a specific
plan to wage aggressive war, and the Tribunal there-
fore cannot hold that theoe activities were criminal
under the Charter. After the purge, the SA was
reduced to the status of a group of unimportant Nazi
hangers-on. Although in specific instances some units
of the SA were used for the commission of war crimes
and crimes against humanity, it cannot be said that
its members generally participated in or even knew
of the criminal acts. For these reasons, the Tribunal
does not declare the SA to be a criminal organization
within the meaning of Article 9 of the Charter.
(E) THE REICH CABINET
The prosecution has named as a criminal organiza-
tion the Reich Cabinet (Die Reichsregierung) con-
sisting of members of the ordinary cabinet after Jan-
uary 30, 1933, members of the council of ministers for
the defense of the Reich and members of the secret
cabinet council. The Tribunal is of opinion that no
declaration of criminality should be made with respect
to the Reich Cabinet for two reasons: (1) Because it
is not shown that after 1937 it ever really acted as a
group or organization; (2) because the group of per-
sons here charged is so small that members could be
conveniently tried in proper cases without resort to
a declaration that the Cabinet of which they were
members was criminal.
As to the first reason for our decision, it is to be
observed that from the time that it can be said that
a conspiracy to make aggressive war existed the
Reich Cabinet did not constitute a governing body,
but was merely an aggregation of administrative offi-
cers subject to the absolute control of Hitler. Not a
single meeting of the Reich Cabinet was held after
1937, but laws were promulgated in the name of one
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or more of the cabinet members. The Secret Cabinet
Council never met at all. A number of the cabinet
members were undoubtedly involved in the con-
spiracy to make aggressive war; but they were in-
volved as individuals, and there is no evidence that
the cabinet as a group or organization took any part
in these crimes. It will be remembered that when
Hitler disclosed his aims of criminal aggression at the
Hossbach Conference, the disclosure was not made
before the cabinet and that the cabinet was not con-
sulted with regard to it, but, on the contrary, that it
was made secretly to a small group upon whom
Hitler would necessarily rely in carrying on the war.
Likewise no cabinet order authorized the invasion of
Poland. On the contrary, the defendant Schacht
testifies that he sought to stop the invasion by a plea
to the commander in chief of the army that Hitler's
order was in violation of the constitution because
not authorized by the cabinet.
It does appear, however, that various laws author-
izing acts which were criminal under the Charter
were circulated among the members of the Reich
Cabinet and issued under its authority signed by the
members whose departments were concerned. This
does not, however, prove that the Reich Cabinet,
after 1937, ever really acted as an organization.
As to the second reason, it is clear that those mem-
bers of the Reich Cabinet who have been guilty of
crimes should be brought to trial; and a number ^g)f
them are now on trial before the Tribunal. It is
estimated that there are 48 members of the group,
that 8 of these are dead and 17 are now on trial, leav-
ing only 23 at the most, as to whom the declaration
could have any importance. Any others who are
guilty should also be brought to trial; but nothing
would be accomplished to expedite or facilitate their
trials by declaring the Reich Cabinet to be a criminal
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organization. Where an organization with a large
membership is used for such purposes, a declaration
obviates the necessity of inquiring as to its criminal
character in the later trial of members who are ac-
cused of participating through membership in its
criminal purposes and thus saves much time and
trouble. There is no such advantage in the case of a
small group like the Reich Cabinet.
(F) GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND
The prosecution has also asked that the General
Staff and High Command of the German armed
forces be declared a criminal organization. The
Tribunal believes that no declaration of criminality
should be made with respect to the General Staff and
High Command. The number of persons charged,
while larger than that of the Reich Cabinet, is still so
small that individual trials of these officers would
accomplish the purpose here sought better than a
declaration such as is requested. But a more com-
pelling reason is that in the opinion of the Tribunal
the General Staff and High Command is neither an
"organization" nor a "group" within the meaning
of those terms as used in Article 9 of the Charter.
Some comment on the nature of this alleged group
is requisite. According to the indictment and evi-
dence before the Tribunal, it consists of approxi-
mately 130 officers, living and dead, who at any
ti£>\e during the period from February 1938, when
Hitler reorganized the armed forces, and May 1945,
when Germany surrendered, held certain positions
in the military hierarchy. These men were high-
ranking officers in the three armed services: OKH
—
army, OKM—navy, and OKL—air force. Above
them was the over-all armed forces authority,
OKW—high command of the German armed forces-
with Hitler as the supreme commander. The officers
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in the OKW, including defendant Keitel as chief of
the high command, were in a sense Hitler's personal
star!. In the larger sense they coordinated and
directed the three services, with particular emphasis
on the functions of planning and operations.
The individual officers in this alleged group were,
at one time or another, in one of four categories:
(1) Commanders in chief of one of the three services;
(2) chief of staff of one of the three services; (3)
"Oberbefehlshabers," the field commanders in chief
of one of the three services, which of course comprised
by far the largest number of these persons; or (4) an
OKW officer, of which there were three, defendants
Keitel and Jodl, and the latter's deputy chief, Warli-
mont. This is the meaning of the indictment in its
use of the term "General Staff and High Command."
The prosecution has here drawn the line. The
prosecution does not indict the next level of the
military hierarchy consisting of commanders of army
corps, and equivalent ranks in the navy and air force,
nor the level below, the division commanders or
their equivalent in the other branches. And the staff
officers of the four staff commands of OKW, OKH,
OKM, and OKL are not included, nor are the trained
specialists who were customarily called General Staff
officers.
In effect, then, those indicted as members are mili-
tary leaders of the Reich of the highest rank. No
serious effort was made to assert that they composed
an "organization" in the sense of Article 9. The
assertion is rather that they were a "group," which
is a wider and more embracing term than "organiza-
tion." ,
The Tribunal does not so find. According to the
evidence, their planning at staff level, the constant
conferences between staff officers and field com-
manders, their operational technique in the field and
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at headquarters was much the same as that of the
armies, navies, and air forces of all other countries.
The over-all effort of OKW at coordination and direc-
tion could be matched by a similar, though not
identical form of organization in other military forces,
such as the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of
Staff.
To derive from this pattern of their activities the
existence of an association or group does not, in the
opinion of the Tribunal, logically follow. On such a
theory the top commanders of every other nation are
just such an association rather than what they actu-
ally are, an aggregation of military men, a number
of individuals who happen at a given period of time
to hold the high-ranking military positions.
Much of the evidence and the argument has cen-
tered around the question of whether membership in
these organizations was or was not voluntary; in
this case, it seems to the Tribunal to be quite beside
the point. For this alleged criminal organization has
one characteristic, a controlling one, which sharply
distinguishes it from the other five indicted. When
an individual became a member of the SS for instance,
he did so, voluntarily or otherwise, but certainly
with the knowledge that he was joining something.
In the case of the General Staff and High Command,
however, he could not know he was joining a group
or organization for such organization did not exist
except in the charge of the indictment. He knew
only that he had achieved a certain high rank in one
of the three services, and could not be conscious of
the fact that- he was becoming a member of anything
so tangible as a "group," as that word is commonly
used. His relations with his brother officers in his
own branch of the service and his association with
those of the other two branches were, in general,
like those of other services all over the world.
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The Tribunal therefore does not declare the Gen-
eral Staff and High Command to be a criminal
organization.
Although the Tribunal is of the opinion that the
term "group" in Article 9 must mean something
more than this collection of military officers, it has
heard much evidence as to the participation of these
officers in planning and waging aggressive war, and
in committing war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity. This evidence is, as to many of them, clear
and convincing.
They have been responsible in large measure for
the miseries and suffering that have fallen on millions
of men, women, and children. They have been a
disgrace to the honorable profession of arms. With-
out their military guidance the aggressive ambitions
of Hitler and his fellow Nazis would have been aca-
demic and sterile. Although they were not a group
falling within the words of the Charter, they were
certainly a ruthless military caste. The contem-
porary German militarism flourished briefly with
its recent ally, National Socialism, as well as or better
than it had in the generations of the past.
Many of these men have made a mockery of the
soldier's oath of obedience to military orders. When
it suits their defense they say they had to obey;
when confronted with Hitler's brutal crimes, which
are shown to have been within their general knowl-
edge, they say they disobeyed. The truth is they
actively participated in all these crimes, or sat silent
and acquiescent, witnessing the commission of crimes
on a scale larger and more shocking than the world
has ever had the misfortune to know. This must
be said.
Where the facts warrant it, these men should be
brought to trial so that thosejamong them who are
guilty of these crimes should not escape punishment..
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The Accused Individuals
Article 26 of the Charter provides that the judg-
ment of theTribunal as to the guilt or innocence of
any defendant shall give the reasons on which it is
based.
The Tribunal will now state those reasons in de-
claring its judgment on such guilt or innocence.
[The Tribunal's discussion of the cases
against the individual defendants, except those
against Doenitz and Raeder, is omitted.]
Doenitz
Doenitz is indicted on counts one, two, and three.
In 1935 he took command of the first U-boat flotilla
commissioned since 1918, became in 1936 Commander
of the submarine arm, was made Vice Admiral in
1940, Admiral in 1942, and on January 30, 1943
Commander in Chief of the German Navy. On 1
May 1945, he became the Head of State, succeeding
Hitler.
Crimes against peace.—Although Doenitz built and
trained the German U-boat arm, the evidence does
not show he was privy to the conspiracy to wage
aggressive wars or that he prepared and initiated
such wars. He was a line officer performing strictly
tactical duties. He was not present at the impor-
tant conferences when plans for aggressive wars
were announced, and there is no evidence he was in-
formed about the decisions reached there. Doenitz
did, however, wage aggressive war within the mean-
ing of that word as used by the Charter. Submarine
warfare which began immediately upon the outbreak
of war, was fully coordinated with the other branches
of the Wehrmacht. It is clear that his U-boats,
few in number at the time, were fully prepared to
wage war.
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It is true that until his appointment in January
1943 as Commander in Chief he was not an "Ober-
befehlshaber." But this statement under-estimates
the importance of Doenitz' position. He was no
mere army or division commander. The U-boat
arm was the principal part of the German fleet and
Doenitz was its leader. The High Seas Fleet made
a few minor, if spectacular, raids during the early
years of the war but the real damage to the enemy
was done almost exclusively by his submarines as the
millions of tons of allied and neutral shipping sunk
will testify. Doenitz was solely in charge of this
warfare. The naval war command reserved for it-
self only the decision as to the number of submarines
in each area. In the invasion of Norway, for ex-
ample, Doenitz made recommendations in October
1939 as to submarine bases, which he claims were no
more than a staff study, and in March 1940 he made
out the operational orders for the supporting U-boats
as discussed elsewhere in this judgment.
That his importance to the German war effort
was so regarded is eloquently proved by Raeder's
recommendation of Doenitz as his successor and his
appointment by Hitler on 30 January 1943, as
Commander in Chief of the Navy. Hitler too knew
that submarine warfare was the essential part of
Germany's naval warfare.
From January 1943, Doenitz was consulted almost
continuously by Hitler. The evidence was that they
conferred on naval problems about 120 times during
the course of the war.
As late as April 1945, when he admits he knew
the struggle was hopeless, Doenitz as its Commander
in Chief urged the Navy to continue its fight. On
1 May 1945, he became the Head of State and as
such ordered the Wehrmacht to continue its war in
the east, until capitulation on 9 May 1945. Doenitz
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explained that his reason for these orders was to
insure that the German civilian population might
be evacuated and the army might make an orderly
retreat from the east.
In the view of the Tribunal, the evidence shows
that Doenitz was active in waging aggressive war.
War crimes.—Doenitz is charged with waging un-
restricted submarine warfare contrary to the Naval
Protocol of 1936, to which Germany acceded, and
which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid
down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930.
The prosecution has submitted that on 3 Septem-
ber 1939, the German U-boat arm began to wage
unrestricted submarine warfare upon all merchant
ships, whether enemy or neutral, cynically disre-
garding the Protocol; and that a calculated effort
was made throughout the war to disguise this prac-
tice by making hypocritical references to international
law and supposed violations by the Allies.
Doenitz insists that at all times the Navy remained
within the confines of international law and of the
Protocol. He testified that when the war began,
the guide to submarine warfare was the German
prize ordinance taken almost literally from the
Protocol, that pursuant to the German view, he
ordered submarines to attack all merchant ships in
convoy, and all that refused to stop or used their
radio upon sighting a submarine. When his reports
indicated that British merchant ships were being
used to give information by wireless, were being
armed, and were attacking submarines on sight, he
ordered his submarines on 17 October 1939, to attack
all enemy merchant ships without warning on the
ground that resistance was to be expected. Orders
already had been issued on 21 September 1939, to
attack all ships, including neutrals, sailing at night
without lights in the English Channel.
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On 24 November 1939, the German Government
issued a warning to neutral shipping that, owing to
the frequent engagements taking place in the waters
around the British Isles and the French coast be-
tween U-boats and Allied merchant ships which
were armed and had instructions to use those arms
as well as to ram U-boats, the safety of neutral ships
in those waters could no longer be taken for granted.
On 1 January 1940, the German U-boat command,
acting on the instructions of Hitler, ordered U-boats
to attack all Greek merchant ships in the zone sur-
rounding the British Isles which was banned by the
United States to its own ships and also merchant ships
of every nationality in the limited area of the Bristol
Channel. Five days later, a further order was given
to U-boats to "make immediately unrestricted use
of weapons against all ships" in an area of the North
Sea, the limits of which were defined. Finally on
the 18th of January 1940, U-boats were authorized
to sink, without warning, all ships "in those waters
near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines
can be pretended." Exceptions were to be made in
the cases of United States, Italian, Japanese, and
Soviet ships.
Shortly after the outbreak of war the British
Admiralty, in accordance with its Handbook of
Instructions of 1938 to the merchant navy, armed
its merchant vessels, in many cases convoyed them
with armed escort, gave orders to send position
reports upon sighting submarines, thus integrating
merchant vessels into the warning network of naval
intelligence. On 1 October 1939, the British Ad-
miralty announced that British merchant ships had
been ordered to ram U-boats if possible.
In the actual circumstances of this case, the
Tribunal is not prepared to hold Doenitz guilty for his
777534—48 20
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conduct of submarine warfare against British armed
merchant ships.
However, the proclamation of operational zones
and the sinking of neutral merchant vessels which
enter those zones presents a different question.
This practice was employed in the war of 1914-18
by Germany and adopted in retaliation by Great
Britain. The Washington conference of 1922, the
London Naval Agreement of 1930, and the protocol
of 1936 were entered into with full knowledge that
such zones had been employed in the First World
War. Yet the protocol made no exception for
operational zones. The order of Doenitz to sink
neutral ships without warning when found within
these zones was, therefore, in the opinion of the
Tribunal, a violation of the protocol.
It is also asserted that the German U-boat arm
not only did not carry out the warning and rescue
provisions of the protocol but that Doenitz delib-
erately ordered the killing of survivors of ship-
wrecked vessels, whether enemy or neutral. The
prosecution has introduced much evidence surround-
ing two orders of Doenitz, war order No. 154, issued
in 1939, and the so-called "Laconia" order of 1942.
The defense argues that these orders and the evi-
dence supporting them do not show such a policy
and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The
Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not
establish with the certainty required that Doenitz
deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked sur-
vivors. The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous,
and deserve the strongest censure.
The evidence further shows that the rescue provi-
sions were not carried out and that the defendant
ordered that they should not be carried out. The
argument of the defense is that the security of the
submarine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount
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to rescue and that the development of aircraft made
rescue impossible. This may be so, but the protocol
is explicit. If the commander cannot rescue, then
under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel
and should allow it to pass harmless before his
periscope. These orders, then, prove Doenitz is
guilty of a violation of the protocol.
In view of all of the facts proved and in particular
of an order of the British Admiralty announced on 8
May 1940, according to which all vessels should be
sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answers to
interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that
unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in
the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the
first day that Nation entered the war, the sentence
of Doenitz is not assessed on the ground of his
breaches of the international law of submarine
warfare.
Doenitz was also charged with responsibility for
Hitler's commando order of 18 October 1942.
Doenitz admitted he received and knew of the order
when he was flag officer of U-boats, but disclaimed
responsibility. He points out that the order by its
express terms excluded men captured in naval war-
fare, that the navy had no territorial commands on
land, and that submarine commanders would never
encounter commandos.
In one instance, when he was Commander in
Chief of the Navy, in 1943, the members of the crew
of an Allied motor torpedo boat were captured by
German naval forces. They were interrogated for
intelligence purposes on behalf of the local Admiral,
and then turned over by his order to the SD and
shot. Doenitz said that if they were captured by
the Navy their execution was a violation of the
commando order, that the execution was not an-
nounced in the Wehrmacht communique, and that
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he was never informed of the incident. He pointed
out that the Admiral in question was not in his
chain of command, but was subordinate to the
Army general in command of the Norway occupa-
tion. But Doenitz permitted the order to remain
in full force when he became Commander in Chief,
and to that extent he is responsible.
Doenitz, in a conference of 11 December 1944,
said, " 12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be
employed in the shipyards as additional labor."
At this time Doenitz had no jurisdiction over ship-
yard construction, and claims that this was merely
a suggestion at the meeting that the responsible
officials do something about the production of ships,
that he took no steps to get these workers since it
was not a matter for his jurisdiction and that he does
not know whether they ever were procured. He
admits he knew of concentration camps. A man in
his position must necessarily have known that
citizens of occupied countries in large numbers were
confined in the concentration camps.
In 1945, Hitler requested the opinion of Jodl and
Doenitz whether the Geneva Convention should be
denounced. The notes of the meeting between the
two military leaders on 20 February 1945, show that
Doenitz expressed his view that the disadvantages
of such an action outweighed the advantages. -The
summary of Doenitz' attitude shown in the notes
taken by an officer, included the following sentence:
"It would be better to carry out the -measures considered
necessary without warning, and at all costs to save face with
the outer world."
The prosecution insisted that "the measures"
referred to meant the Convention should not be
denounced, but should be broken at will. The
defense explanation is that Hitler wanted to break
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the Convention for two reasons: to take away from
German troops the protection of the Convention,
thus preventing them from continuing to surrender
in large groups to the British and Americans; and
also to permit reprisals against Allied prisoners of
war because of Allied bombing raids. Doenitz
claims that what he meant by "measures" were dis-
ciplinary measures against German troops to prevent
them from surrendering, and that his words had no
reference to measures against the Allies; moreover,
that this was merely a suggestion, and that in any
event no such measures were ever taken, either
against Allies or Germans. The Tribunal, however,
does not believe this explanation. The Geneva
Convention was not, however, denounced by Ger-
many. The defense has introduced several affidavits
to prove that British naval prisoners of war in camps
under Doenitz' jurisdiction were treated strictly
according to the Convention, and the Tribunal
takes this fact into consideration, regarding it as a
mitigating circumstance.
Conclusion.—The Tribunal finds Doenitz is not
guilty on count one of the indictment, and is guilty
on counts two and three.
RAEDER
Raeder is indicted on counts one, two, and three.
In 1928 he became Chief of Naval Command and in
1935 Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (OKM);
in 1939 Hitler made him Gross Admiral. He was a
member of the Reich Defense Council. On 30
January 1943, Doenitz replaced him at his own re-
quest, and he became Admiral Inspector of the
Navy, a nominal title.
Crimes against peace.—In the IS years he com-
manded it, Raeder built and directed the German
Navy; he accepts full responsibility until retirement
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in 1943. He admits the navy violated the Versailles
Treaty, insisting it was "a matter of honor for every
man" to do so, and alleges that the violations were
for the most part minor, and Germany built less than
her allowable strength. These violations, as well
as those of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of
1935, have already been discussed elsewhere in this
judgment.
Raeder received the directive of 24 June 1937,
from von Blomberg, requiring special preparations
for war against Austria. He was one of the five
leaders present at the Hossbach Conference of 5
November 1937. He claims Hitler merely wished
by this conference to spur the army to faster re-
armament, insists he believed the questions of Austria
and Czechoslovakia would be settled peacefully, as
they were, and points to the new Naval treaty with
England which had just been signed. He received
no orders to speed construction of U-boats, indicating
that Hitler was not planning war.
Raeder received directives on "Fall Gruen" and
the directives on "Fall Weiss" beginning with that
of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the navy to
support the army by intervention from the sea. He
was also one of the few chief leaders present at the
meeting of 23 May 1939. He attended the Ober-
salzburg briefing of 22 August 1939.
The conception of the invasion of Norway first
arose in the mind of Raeder and not that of Hitler.
Despite Hitler's desire, as shown by his directive
of October 1939, to keep Scandinavia neutral, the
Navy examined the advantages of naval bases there
as early as October. Admiral Karls originally sug-
gested to Raeder the desirable aspects of bases in
Norway. A questionnaire, dated 3 October 1939,
which sought comments on the desirability of such
bases, was circulated within SKL. On 10 October,
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Raeder discussed the matter with Hitler; his war
diary entry for that day says Hitler intended to give
the matter consideration. A few months later
Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel, and Jodl;.
OKW began its planning and the Naval War Staff
worked with OKW staff officers. Raeder received
Keitel's directive for Norway on 27 January 1940,
and the subsequent directive of 1 March, signed
by Hitler.
Raeder defends his actions on the ground it was a
move to forestall the British. It is not necessary
again to discuss this defense, which has heretofore
been treated in some detail, concluding that Ger-
many's invasion of Norway and Denmark was
aggressive war. In a letter to the Navy, Raeder
said: "The operations of the Navy in the occupation
of Norway will for all time remain the great contri-
bution of the Navy to this war."
Raeder received the directives, including the in-
numerable postponements, for the attack in the west.
In a meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler he urged
the occupation of all Greece. He claims this was
only after the British had landed and Hitler had
ordered the attack, and points out the navy had no
interest in Greece. He received Hitler's directive
on Yugoslavia.
Raeder endeavored to dissuade Hitler from em-
barking upon the invasion of the USSR. In Septem-
ber 1940 he urged on Hitler an aggressive Mediterra-
nean policy as an alternative to an attack on Russia.
On 14 November 1940, he urged the war against Eng-
land "as our main enemy" and that submarine and
naval air force construction be continued. He voiced
"serious objections against the Russian campaign
before the defeat of England," according to notes of
the German naval war staff. He claims his objec-
tions were based on the violation of the Non-Aggres-
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sion Pact as well as strategy. But once the decision
had been made, he gave permission 6 days before
the invasion of the Soviet Union to attack Russian
submarines in the Baltic Sea within a specified warn-
ing area and defends this action because these sub-
marines were "snooping" on German activities.
It is clear from this evidence that Raeder partici-
pated in the planning and waging of aggressive war.
War crimes.—Raeder is charged with war crimes
on the high seas. The Athenia, an unarmed British
passenger liner, was sunk on 3 September 1939, while
outward bound to America. The Germans 2 months
later charged that Mr. Churchill deliberately sank
the Athenia to encourage American hostility to
Germany. In fact, it was sunk by the German
U-boat 30. Raeder claims that an inexperienced
U-boat commander sank it in mistake for an armed
merchant cruiser, that this was not known until the
U-30 returned several weeks after the German denial
and that Hitler then directed the Navy and Foreign
Office to continue denying it. Raeder denied knowl-
edge of the propaganda campaign attacking Mr.
Churchill. The most serious charge against Raeder
is that he carried out unrestricted submarine warfare,
including sinking of unarmed merchant ships, of
neutrals, nonrescue and machine-gunning of sur-
vivors, contrary to the London Protocol of 1936.
The Tribunal makes the same finding on Raeder on
this charge as it did as to Doenitz, which has already
been announced, up until 30 January 1943, when
Raeder retired.
The commando order of 18 October 1942, which
expressly did hot apply to naval warfare, was trans-
mitted by the Naval War Staff to the lower naval
commanders with the direction it should be distrib-
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uted orally by flotilla leaders and section commanders
to their subordinates. Two commandos were put to
death by the Navy, and not by the SD, at Bordeaux
on 10 December 1942. The comment of the Naval
War Staff was that this was "in accordance with the
Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless something
new in international law, since the soldiers were in
uniform." Raeder admits he passed the order down
through the chain of command, and he did not
object to Hitler.
Conclusion.—The Tribunal finds that Raeder is
guilty on counts one, two, and three. * * *
1 October 1946
/s/ Geoffrey Law- /s/ Nikitchenko
rence, President /s/ Norman Birkett
/s/ Francis Biddle /s/ John J. Parker
/s/ H. Donnedieu De /s/ R. Falco




(a) To acquit the defendants Hjalmar Schacht,
Franz von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche.
(b) To sentence the defendant Rudolf Hess to
life imprisonment.
(c) Not to declare .criminal the following organi-
zations : the Reich Cabinet, General Staff and OKW.
In this respect I cannot agree with the decision
adopted by the Tribunal as it does not correspond
to the facts of the case and is based on incorrect
conclusions. . . .
Soviet Member IMT, Major General Jurispru-
dence.
[signed] I. T. Nikitchenko.
1 October 1946.
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Indicted Groups and Organizations
Reich Cabinet Not criminal.
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party Criminal in part.
SS {Schutzstaffeln), including SD (Sicherheitsdienst) Criminal.
SA (Sturmabteilung) Not criminal.
Gestapo {Geheime Staatspolizei) Criminal.
General Staff and High Command of the Armed Forces Not criminal.
(22) Resolution of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, 11 December 1946
(Journal of the United Nations, No. 58, Supplement A, p. 485)
The General Assembly,
Recognizes the obligation laid upon it by Article
13, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph a of the Charter, to
